On April 22 and 23, 2004, a diverse group of 14 policymakers, modelers, analysts, and scholars met with some 22 members of the Sandia National Laboratories staff to explores ways in which the relationships between modelers and policymakers in the energy and environment fields (with an emphasis on energy) could be made more productive for both. This report is not a transcription of that workshop, but draws very heavily on its proceedings. It first describes the concept of modeling, the varying ways in which models are used to support policymaking, and the institutional context for those uses. It then proposes that the goal of modelers and policymakers should be a relationship of mutual trust, built on a foundation of communication, supported by the twin pillars of policy relevance and technical credibility. The report suggests 20 guidelines to help modelers improve the relationship, followed by 10 guidelines to help policymakers toward the same goal.
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Modelers and Policymakers: Improving the Relationship

Executive Summary
On April 22 and 23, 2004, a diverse group of 14 policymakers, modelers, analysts, and scholars met with some 22 members of the Sandia National Laboratories staff to explores ways in which the relationships between modelers and policymakers in the energy and environment fields (with an emphasis on energy) could be made more productive for both. This report is not a transcription of that workshop, but draws very heavily on its proceedings.
A model is a representation of a physical (or social, or both) system (including objects-and possibly people-and processes) that in some way simulates the behavior of the system. Although models may be kept in the head or on paper, and mentally or hand (pencil, calculator) operated, the emphasis in this report is on models large and complex enough to require running on a computer. It is nevertheless important to keep in mind that computational models are based on human concepts about how the represented systems work, and get their data (usually) from human sources. For policymaking uses, what counts in the end is the human analysis, which may be based only in part on the outputs of the model. This report uses the term "model" as shorthand for the combined modeling and analysis activity.
Models may be used for many purposes, but this report focuses on their applications in support of public policymaking. These may include:
•Predictions for cost/benefit or cost/effectiveness analysis; •Understanding complex relationships-and the uncertainties--in problem variables;
•Exploring a range of scenarios;
•Building a framework for discussion, group learning, or negotiation;
•Postponing difficult decisions;
•Finding a "scientific" answer to politically controversial issues;
•Building a rationale for a policy already chosen.
Models used in support of policymaking are, almost by definition, embedded in a political process. It is important for all involved to acknowledge the goals, constraints, and incentives the political context implied in each case.
In addition, it is important to recognize that modeling (along with the accompanying analyses) is likely to be just one of many inputs into the policymaking process-and perhaps only a minor one at that. Even so, modeling has the potential to enhance the process by improving understanding of the possible consequences of policy choices, deepening policymakers' comprehension of the underlying problems and issues, clarifying decision-makers' assumptions and values helping to build understandable 6 narratives ("stories") in support of policy proposals, informing dialogue among stakeholders and policymakers, or providing a framework for negotiation and consensus building.
Policymakers are more likely to make use of analyses that come from modelers whom they have come to trust. By virtue of the client-specialist relationship, the burden of trust building falls primarily on the side of the modelers. They need, first of all, to communicate well with the policymakers. The policymaker trusts the modeler when the latter has shown that he or she can produce modeling and analyses that are both relevant to the former's needs and technically credible. Table 1 summarizes a set of guidelines that modelers might follow to improve their relationships with policymakers. This report concerns the uses of models to support making decisions about public policy, particularly energy policy. But what is a "model"? Table 3 offers six definitions from various sources. No one of these alone seems satisfactory, but together they provide a collection of attributes that add up to a useful description. A model is a representation of a physical (or social, or both) system (including objects-and possibly people-and processes) that in some way simulates the behavior of the system; may consist of a mentally manipulated set of concepts, a physical system, a mathematical description, a computer program, or some combination of these; may analyze (or solve) a problem, increase understanding of the system it simulates, forecast future states of that system, or predict the outcomes of measures taken to change the system. Although models may be kept in the head or on paper, and mentally or hand (pencil, calculator) operated, the emphasis in this report is on computational models-9 Table 3 : What is a Model? Some Definitions A system of postulates, data, and inferences presented as a mathematical description of an entity or state of affairs.
Merriam-Webster Online
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/)
A schematic description of a system, theory, or phenomenon that accounts for its known or inferred properties and may be used for further study of its characteristics: a model of generative grammar; a model of an atom; an economic model. A representation of a set of components of a process, system, or subject area. A model is generally developed for understanding, analysis, improvement, and/or replacement of the process.
YourDictionary.com (http:
General Accounting Office, BPR Glossary of Terms (http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/bpra g/bprgloss.htm#sectM ) 1 those large and complex enough to require running on a computer. It is nevertheless important to keep in mind that computational models are based on human concepts about how the represented systems work, and they get their data (usually) from human sources. Humans select the questions posed to the models and interpret the results.
How Are Models Used? 1 Models may be used as tools to support public policy making (as well as for helping the making of decisions by non-governmental institutions), but they have other applications that do not relate directly to policymaking. Scientists may use models to increase their understanding of phenomena they are studying. Engineers may use models to design machines or structures that will perform in desired ways. Educators or trainers may use simulations to give their students the "feel" of a work environment (e.g., an airplane in flight, or a business situation). Military organizations may use simulations not only to train soldiers in the use of equipment, but to give experience in military decisionmaking.
As do the military, policymakers also sometimes use models to support training that gives practice or experience. Policy games (as opposed to war games) may help teach officials (and perhaps members of other organizations who interact with them) how the policy process works-who communicates to whom about what, and how decisions get made. Or, such games may increase the participants experience in dealing with difficult issues, where the focus is not on finding the "correct" policy answers, but on learning to cope with policy challenges competently and creatively.
More often, however, models are part of analytic efforts intended to improve policy decisions. "Public policy" consists (roughly) of governmental intentions, decisions, actions, laws, regulations and edicts. There are several ways in which models can be used to support public policymaking in general and energy policymaking in particular. The most obvious application is in the direct analysis and evaluation of possible policy choices. In this application, the model generates predictions about the outcomes of choices under consideration. For example, the model might predict that if legislation set a new corporate average fuel economy ("CAFE") standard at x miles per gallon of gas, then by the year 2nnn, national consumption of gasoline would be y gallons per year less than if the current standard were retained. Predictions might be made about the cost of changing the CAFE standard compared with the costs of alternative methods of achieving the same reduction in consumption (cost/effectiveness analysis.) Or, predictions might be made about both the cost of imposing the standard and the benefit of the expected reduction in consumption (cost/benefit analysis.)
Accurate predictions about the future-and about policy attempts to affect the future-would be nice to have, but can we really get them? Scholars have argued that for systems as complex as the environment, accurate predictions (especially long-term ones) Note, though , that "understanding the relationships" still implies a degree, even if a very relaxed one, of prediction. Policymaking, after all, is about trying to affect the future: to maintain or improve on the status quo of public wellbeing. (Or even, if one is cynical about it, to maintain or advance the public official's political position.) The reason a policymaker would want to better understand the relationships relevant to some issue would be to improve his or her ability to estimate the consequences of policy decisions.
Some styles of policymaking, however, may use only a very loose form of prediction: exploration of a wide range of possible futures, without an attempt to identify the most or least probable among them. This is the idea behind the "scenario planning" method policymaking, in which organizations attempt to identify adaptive strategies that will be "robust" or "resilient" however the future turns out. 4 A team at the Rand Corporation has argued that quantitative modeling can support the scenario planning method.
5 Still, some degree of prediction is implied. Rough probability distributions of a range of possible outcomes may offer at least some reduction of the uncertainty under which decisions must be taken.
Even if models do not greatly increase policymakers' abilities to predict the future, they may at the very least improve their understanding of what is known and what is uncertain. Mental models, which all policymakers use either explicitly or implicitly, may be necessary, but they are subject to certain problems. Some (or many) of the mental modelers' assumptions about how the world works may be implicit and unexamined. The "running" of the model in policymakers' heads may or may not be internally consistent from one case to the next. The underlying reasoning leading to the policymakers' 1 conclusions may be difficult to explain. Psychological biases and cognitive limitations may undermine the logical application of the model. 6 Building a formal model (whether in words, mathematical formulae, or computer programs), on the other hand, can ameliorate these problems. It forces identification of assumptions, specification of logical relations and procedures. The model should return the same results no matter who runs it (assuming, of course, the same inputs). At least if well documented, the model is explicable to others and examinable by others. It can provide a framework for discussion of what is known and what is not known about the system it represents.
Indeed, providing a framework for discussion can become the primary function of a model. When stakeholders and policymakers are involved in early stages of model design, development, and use, the model can become a tool by which they discuss their points of view, interests, and assumptions. Discussion of model relationships and data can give those involved a common language and focus of analysis. Sandia National Laboratories worked with The Middle Rio Grande Water Assembly (a non-governmental organization) to develop a hydrologic-ecologic-economic model of New Mexico water resources that could be used in long-term planning. The model builders concluded that Perhaps the most important role of the model in the planning process was in promoting, initiating, and informing dialogue. In many cases the dialogue arose simply from the process of exploring the impacts of alternative water conservation measures. Participants were naturally drawn to offer their "what if" scenarios for testing. This led to questions and discussions of the pros and cons of the different alternatives. In many cases the questions led to discussions lasting weeks and months, which often led to greater understanding and clarity. These discussions often helped participants consider the broader, system-wide implications of proposed actions. Certainly the modelers strove for at least roughly accurate prediction of the consequences of proposed policy alternatives (and appear to have achieved good "postdiction" of recent phenomena), but in any case the model permitted dialogue to be based on the best (commonly agreed) knowledge available of what the future might bring. In addition, the model could be used to educate the general public about the complexity of the water system, permitting graphical, "what-if" experimentation with the variables.
Participatory modeling can benefit those involved in building the model even when the completed model is not used as a communications framework. The very act of constructing a model requires learning, in a structured way, how the modeled system works. Thus the mental model that the participant leaves with may be more sophisticated and more reflective of the best knowledge on the subject-the analyst or policymaker becomes a more proficient expert himself.
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The Political Dimension A model may also contribute to the policymaking process by giving officials a clear and persuasive "story" about the course of action they propose that constituents and stakeholders accept. To give a simple example, the report of the Bush administration National Energy Policy Development Group opens with a graph derived from models forecasting U.S energy consumption through the year 2020, showing a large shortfall if U.S. energy production only continues to grow at recent rates. 8 The document then argues for (among other things) various measures to increase production.
Not only government officials, but private organizations (firms, associations, public interest groups) may use models to develop and tell a "story." Whether commissioned by a governmental or a non-governmental organization, models are at risk of being designed and used to support pre-existing conclusions. And even if they are not, their association with a particular sponsor may put them under among opposing groups. As Craig et. al. point out,
The technical quality of an analysis does not assure impact. Energy forecasts are carried out for a variety of reasons. They are commonly released in complex, sometimes sharply polarized, political environments with contending interests, sometimes with the ruling political mindset already made up. Greenberger et. al. reviewed 14 major energy studies undertaken in 1972 to 1982.. They found 9 to be highly controversial and politicized in their execution, reception, or use…The Ford Energy Policy project, initiated in 1972 and released in 1974, called forth plaudits as well as resentment and antagonism owing to its conclusions emphasizing the need for energy conservation to be driven by regulatory measures…The Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) was stunned by the criticism of its first report (ERDA-48) released in 1975, which slighted conservation options and adopted a supply focus.
Despite this seemingly harsh finding, the authors conclude that models can still be useful because they can clarify issues in debate, enforce a discipline of analysis and discourse, and give policymakers at least some indication (whether used or not) whether a particular policy is likely to produce outcomes within an acceptable range. They point out, however, that Models are not much use in times of ideological upheaval, simply because the decisions are based on beliefs rather than facts. Ideological policy makers appeal to their own versions of facts, and dismiss the facts of others as falsehoods. In this way, the fundamental assumptions of policy modeling are upended.
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Sometimes, models may be used not to make arguments, but to avoid arguments. For example, policymakers may cast a difficult decision as one for "science" to resolve: if the model predicts that certain criteria (say, of safety or environmental impact) will be met, then the proposed actions should be taken (or not). Alternatively, uncertainties in current models may provide a reason to postpone action, either to pass difficult decisions on to later policymakers or to avoid an action altogether by continuing the postponement indefinitely.
Modeling in Context
Models and scientific and technical analysis will rarely play a decisive role in policy issues in such complex areas as energy and the environment. This is partly because a high degree of predictive certainty is almost never possible. Indeed, additional research and modeling may actually decrease political consensus, because additional conflicting perspectives and information may be developed. 12 Whether that happens or not, however, public policy decisions will be the product of many factors, including: While policymakers may make use of models in one or more of the ways described above, society's processes for resolving conflicting values and interests are likely to remain more important. Indeed, Sarewitz argues that Even when science is alleged to have played a decisive role in resolving a policy dispute, as in the case of the international ban on production of chemicals that deplete stratospheric ozone, a closer look at the politics usually shows not that the science convinced policy makers to take the correct action, but that the science and the prevailing political interests fortuitously converged.
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Devising Guidelines for Modelers and Policymakers
Although the potential contributions of modeling (and associated analysis) may be limited, governments, foundations, universities, and companies continue to invest considerable money and effort in constructing and using models. How can the most benefit be derived from those investments? That was the primary question for the workshop. Following are some guidelines for modelers and policymakers to consider using to foster a more productive modeler/analyst-policymaker relationship.
Box 1: "Modelers" or "Analysts"?
The topic of the workshop reported here was the uses of modeling for policymaking, particularly in the area of energy policy. An important observation stressed repeatedly at the workshop was that models (whether mental or computational) are tools of analysis, and that the most important issues concern the relationship between analysts, rather than modelers, and policymakers. That certainly makes sense. However, when analysts do employ models (and here we mean more than just implicit or verbally described mental models), the analyst-policymaker relationship does take on additional features-such as the models processing much more complex and perhaps numerous scenarios than a mental operation could. Therefore, although many of the guidelines to follow would apply to analysts (or policymakers receiving analyses) whether they used models or not, several would apply only in the cases where models played a significant role. For convenience, this report will use the term "modeler" most often, even though it may be more accurately referring to "modeler-analysts" or "analysts who use models."
The larger set of recommendations is directed at the modelers (see Box 1). This is probably as it should be. First, modelers are usually providers of goods and services, while policymakers are usually customers or clients. It is generally up to the provider to attempt to meet the needs of the consumer, and not vice-versa. Moreover, the modeler's primary job is building and running the model, doing the analysis, and communicating the results to the appropriate audience. The policymaker, in contrast, is likely using the modeling and 1 analysis as only one input into a broader policy process (see the previous section on "Modeling in Context"). He or she has not only a much wider range of actors to deal with than just the modeler, but probably has a great many more issues to be concerned with than just those addressed by the particular modeler. It therefore behooves the modeler to take on the larger burden of the communication between the two.
Even so, it is in the interests of the policymaker to be an informed and active consumer. Doing so increases his or her chances of getting a useful product from the modeler. Therefore, this report also includes a set of guidelines for policymakers to consider as they interact with modelers.
Guidelines: Some General Concepts
The guidelines to follow were derived mainly from the insightful discussions of the workshop participants. The way in which the guidelines are presented here, however, is based on a conceptual framework illustrated in Figure 1.
• Figure 1: Trust Founded on Communication
Modeling and the analyses derived from it are more likely to have an effect on the policy process when they come from a source that the policymakers (or influential stakeholders) have come to trust. They believe that the model and analyst have dealt fairly with their values and concerns, have used good data, and have employed sound methods. A modeler's strong reputation may incline the policymaker toward trust, but a trusting relationship will likely have to be built with experience.
A pervasive theme of the workshop was the importance of good communication between modelers and policymakers. It is the basic requirement for building a trusting relationship, and symbolized as the foundation of trust in the figure. Communication, however, constitutes the process, rather than the substance of the relationship-the "how" rather than the "what." The two pillars in the figure-the "what"-are relevance and 6 1 credibility. "Relevance" means that the policymaker gets analysis that addresses the questions that concern him or her, and gets it in a usable form. "Credibility" means that the model and associated analysis are scientifically and technically believable.
Guidelines for Modelers
Guidelines for Enhancing Communication 1. Accept the burden of effort.
As noted above, analyses (and the models they may be based on) are only one factor policymakers have to consider, and analysts are only one of many people with whom they interact. Policymakers have little time to think about the quality of their communication with analysts; analysts need to figure out how to communicate about their work most effectively to the policymakers. Do not be tempted to think that your work begins with building (or adapting) a model and ends with analyzing the output. If you want your work to have impact, you also need to consider communication an integral part of your work, not an afterthought.
Understand the context.
As noted earlier (in the section, "How Are Models Used?") models can be used in a variety of ways to support policymaking. Try to comprehend how the modeling and analysis will be used. Do homework. Ask questions. Get as clear a definition of the problem as possible (this may include helping policymakers reformulate their initial questions). Characterize what will be considered "success."
As described above (in the section on "Modeling and Context"), the policymaking process is a complex one, in which modeling and analysis play only one role, frequently a minor one. Identify the legal, political, institutional, and economic constraints under which policies must be made. Understand the role the model and analysis will play in the larger policy process-what else besides the analyses will influence the decision. Learn where the policymaker you are working sits in the process, and what he or she can or cannot affect.
Explain Clearly.
Policymakers need a story both that they can understand and that they can communicate to others in the policy process. This may mean a coherent narrative-"this happens, then that happens, then the result is…" Such "stories" are easier to grasp, remember, and retell than long, complex chains of reasoning interspersed with masses of data. Visualization tools-clear graphic representations of data, illustrations of processes, and metaphorical images may help.
One workshop participant suggested the "mother" test-see if you can communicate the message to an intelligent but non-expert listener. Like that listener, the 1 policymaker probably does not want to deal with opaque jargon and obscure complexities. Remember that your job is to make the policymaker smart, not to show her how smart you are.
Attempt continuing dialogue.
Mutual feedback is better than an interview at the beginning and a briefing at the end. Dialogue at the beginning can clarify objectives and expectations (see Guideline 2 above). Beyond inviting the policymaker to clearly state the questions he would like answered, the modeler may be able to help reformulate the questions in ways that lead to more useful answers. Dialogue in the course of a project can give the modeler feedback about whether expectations are being met and can increase the policymaker's understanding of what is going into the model and the analysis.
In the case of a policymaker contracting for a piece of analysis, the modeler may find it difficult to get much of the policymaker's time. Try. At least ask for a knowledgeable representative with whom to meet regularly.
In some cases, the major purpose of a model is to provide a framework for discussion, mutual learning, and negotiation among a group of policymakers or stakeholders. Then, dialogue about the model may have to consume as much, or even more, of the modeler's time than the technical details of constructing and running the model. As one workshop participant put it, if the policymaker is going to use the modeler's work, she has to know about it first. A modeler who understands the policy context for his or her work (see Guideline 2) has a better chance of identifying the policymakers for whom it will be relevant. Publishing, speaking, and attending meetings in the field of interest should increase the chances of the policymakers hearing about the work. A policymaker may contract for a modeling job directly, or the policymakermodeler relationship may not directly be a financial one. In either case, the modeler, to put it bluntly, needs to do market research to identify those most in need of his services and then do marketing to let the potential "customer" know how he can help.
6. Address the purpose.
Be clear about what purposes are being served. As noted above, models and analysis can serve a variety of purposes in the policymaking process. Possible purposes include:
predictions for cost/benefit or cost/effectiveness analysis; 8 1 understanding complex relationships-and the uncertainties-in problem variables; exploring a range of scenarios; building a framework for discussion, group learning, or negotiation; postponing difficult decisions; finding a "scientific" answer to politically controversial issues; or building a rationale for a policy already chosen.
It might be argued that it does not matter which of the purposes the modeler signs up for, as long as he or she shapes the work to the purpose. That is a major determinant of making it relevant to the policymaker.
Some argue, however, that modelers need to confront ethical problems shared with all those who offer scientific support to policymaking. First is the tension between science and politics; second is the resisting pressures or temptations to tailor the model and analysis to produce the desired conclusions.
Science-PoliticsTensions 14
Most environmental and energy issues are multivariate, complex, nonlinear, and involve both physical systems and human behavior. Science seeks to increase understanding of these phenomena but is-some argue-unlikely to produce meaningful predictions that would permit controlling them. Policymakers, on the other hand, frequently want predictions that will help them build consensus on actions attempting to affect the future. The record suggests scientific prediction for policymaking, at least in the environmental area, has not been particularly successful. For example, a great deal has been spent on the research feeding the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, but many uncertainties remain, as does much political controversy on what actions, if any, to take. The current policy of the U.S. is to conduct further research in hopes of more conclusive predictions.
If predictions (such as those sought by policymakers attempting to conduct costbenefit or cost-effectiveness analyses) are not really feasible, should modelers accept projects whose goal is prediction? In the 1980s, the National Acid Rain Precipitation Assessment Program was conducted with the purpose of producing findings on which to base a national program to limit the sources and ameliorate the effects of acid rain. Instead, although much scientific research was conducted, no timely policy prescriptions emerged from the program; policies were adopted without its direct input. 
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Biasing the Outcome
For perhaps all but the most mercenary modeler, tailoring a model and associated analysis to produce only the desired results would probably be ethically out of bounds. But the problem of bias may not always be starkly clear.
For example, a policymaker believes that an "honest" model will produce results that support her preferred policy position. If the modeler knows this to be the situation (or even if she does not), does producing the expected results necessarily mean that the modeler has performed in a biased or unethical way?
Any model of a real system will inevitably require simplifications, assumptions about uncertain factors and data, and focus on some questions at the expense of others. These may all introduce biases towards a particular outcome or range of outcomes. On the other hand, attempting to change them to counteract the biases may simply introduce biases in another direction.
Finally, complex environmental and energy issues will likely be subject to many uncertainties, with diversity of scientific opinion and debates about what is "true." Whenever the results of the modeling coincide with the predilections of the sponsor, there will be the risk of suspicions of made-to-order science.
Address the salient questions.
Within the general purpose of a modeling study, policymakers will have specific substantive questions to be answered about the issue at hand. The elements of identifying what will be salient may be found in the guidelines above on understanding the context, engaging in continuing dialogue, finding the relevant audience, and addressing the purpose. But identifying what is salient needs to be followed by framing the modeling, analysis, and reporting to actually produce results that policymakers will be perceive as useful.
8. Focus on the problem, not the model. Don't let the tool become the end in itself. Provide information to help the policymaker work the problem, not to show how wonderful the model is. The danger to the modeler is to become wrapped up in the cleverness or beauty of the methodology and to lose sight of purpose and relevance. Don't let the model you happen to have already become a hammer looking for a nail. Also recognize that sometimes a computerized model is not necessary or appropriate for the level of decision involved. Remember that it is the analysis that counts, not the model.
Don't assume the impossible.
Model scenarios that stray too far from the bounds of the economically and politically feasible may result in ignored analyses. This is another reason for Guideline 2, "Understand the Context." Conclusions that are too far from accepted wisdom may be rejected as irrelevant or not credible.
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The modeler does have a dilemma here. One the one hand (unless they are merely trying to bolster their preconceived notions), policymakers do not want to waste time and money on analyses that just tell them what they already know. On the other hand, excessively unconventional findings or policy options that seem totally infeasible are likely to be dismissed-and the rest of the analysis may be dismissed along with them. An example cited at the workshop was an energy policy study that suggested the option of substantial tax increases on gasoline-a political non-starter that led to dismissal of the entire study.
Tell a story that makes sense.
The presentation of the model output (and other analytic efforts) should be in the form of a coherent story (that can be retold), not disjointed pieces of information. This is important not only for the sake of clear communication between modeler and policymaker (Guideline 3 above). It is also important for the policymaker's ability to communicate clearly and persuasively with other players in the policy process.
Recognize time constraints.
Since policy decisions are based on many inputs, with modeling being only one, a situation often arises where the best technical analysis possible within the time constraints is welcomed. Be clear from the beginning about what can and cannot be accomplished in the time allotted. Analysis that comes after decisions are made may be irrelevant or unwelcome. The modeler must carefully weigh the risks and rewards in such situations. Hasty analyses could later be characterized as faulty, damaging reputations. The modeler should consider whether the policymaker understands the limitations of the analysis and will use the analysis prudently.
Guidelines for Establishing Credibility
Pay attention to reputation.
Policymakers listen to those whom they trust. This trust may be based in part on past experience with the analysts, on word of mouth about them, or on their professional reputation. Obviously, it would be better if the policymaker had had previous positive experiences with the modeler, but this is not always possible-there always has to be a first time.
One way to be seen as trustworthy is to conduct processes that seem fair and aredesigned to counter bias. Openness about limitations (Guidelines 13 and 14), transparency (Guideline 17), and review processes (Guideline 19) may help.
In studies where multiple, diverse stakeholders are involved in developing the model from the beginning, those stakeholders may come to trust in the fairness of the process. If those outside the process see that diverse stakeholders were monitoring each others' input, they, too, may see the work as more credible.
On the other hand, even very scientifically sound studies are subject to being seen as biased and not credible if they have been sponsored by organizations with known interests at stake. 16 A lack of scientific consensus over the issues involved will increase the likelihood of challenges to credibility. 17 The prevailing political environment will greatly affect how this phenomenon plays out.
Don't overreach
Sometimes modelers try to use existing models beyond or outside the purposes for which they were designed. Even modeling carefully tailored to the purpose at hand risk omitting significant outliers that are just not quantifiable-such as high-impact, single instance events like wars or terrorist acts. Long-range forecasts are already difficult, but especially vulnerable to unpredictable outliers. 14. Acknowledge data limitations.
The most relevant and up-to-date data are not always available. Drawing conclusions from inadequate data risks loss of credibility. Use sensitivity and uncertainty analysis to better understand data limitations. Consider making recommendations for activities to improve the quality of important data for future uses.
When predicting, show track record.
When predictions (or, in weaker form, an explanation of likely trends and relationships among variables) are offered, the ability of the model (computational or mental) to explain the past lends credibility. It does so even more when it was actually used in the past to predict a future that came true. This is rare. Moreover, past results do not always indicate future performance. First, predictions may turn out to be accurate, but for the wrong reasons. If the model incorrectly simulates the underlying process, the same luck probably will not hold in the future. Second, even if the process was modeled correctly in the past, conditions in complex systems can change enough so that the same model cannot accurately predict outcomes for later periods.
As noted above (p. 10), there is a school of thought that says that predictions of complex environmental phenomena, as well as those that contain a large human behaviorial component, are not really feasible. Modelers agreeing with this position will probably not want to offer predictions in the first place. The problem is that policymakers 2 frequently want numbers. One answer is to explain the limitations of models (see Guideline 13), then "… project rough trade-offs between competing objectives, using sensitivity and uncertainty analyses to check for robustness of conclusions." 18 
Simpler is better.
A large, complex, very detailed model structure with many interactions may be technically impressive, but no better at making predictions or offering insight into relationships than a simpler approach. Models with detailed data but with an overly complext structure may not be very helpful. False precision should not be confused with predictive accuracy. Masses of data may only confuse.
Make models and analyses transparent (having traceable conclusions).
A simpler model structure is also easier to make transparent (the opposite of a black box, whose inner workings are completely concealed from the user). Policymakers who understand how the model works may be more likely to trust the story it is used to tell. Transparency also facilitates comparisons of models with one another, which allows modelers to learn from one another by tracking differences in output to differences in assumptions, algorithms, and data. Full documentation is an important component of transparency, but also try to make the model explicable to non-experts in relatively simple terms. (At the same time, do not oversimplify or talk down to the policymaker.)
Include factors that audiences care about.
This is not just a matter of relevance-addressing what matters. It is also a matter of reassuring policymakers (or stakeholders) that their interests and values have been taken into account, and therefore that they can believe that the model is not biased against them. When the model building process itself is participatory (with stakeholders and policymakers involved), this kind of inclusiveness is explicit. Where only a single modeler (or modeling team) and a single policymaker are involved, they may have to draw on their understanding of the larger policy context to produce a model whose output will be seen as credible by other actors. External reviews (see Guideline 19) may help.
A risk of building models with stakeholder and policymaker participation is that the need to build consensus might lead to oversimplifications or over-weighting of some factors, possibly reducing the technical validity of the model.
Get reviews (peer and/or stakeholder)
"Validation" of models, in the sense of testing their predictive abilities against long-term, real-world events, is rarely possible. Other means of assuring that they are providing the best possible (even if still limited) information are necessary. For models running in software, various software engineering verification tools (systematic developer tests, alpha tests, beta tests) can be applied. In addition, however, the modelers may seek the peer reviews, in which outside experts render opinions on the assumptions, biases, methods, and data used in the models and analysis. Affected stakeholders might also conduct reviews, which may uncover either value biases or methodological shortcomings.
Compare and Collaborate.
Since 1976 the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum has provided a venue for modelers and policymakers to come together to compare and contrast models addressing the same problems. The process can illuminate the structure and parameters of the models, make modeler's assumptions and biases more explicit, reveal model strengths and weaknesses, and enhance everyone's insights in to the policy issues being addressed.
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Policymakers do not want to be the arbiters of competing technical approaches: they are foremost interested in the policy issues, not the methodologies. However, when model comparisons can bring in policymakers as participants, the process can become a communications forum between modelers and policymakers. Both sides can appreciate the role of simplicity and transparency and the benefits of continuing dialogue. They can refine the appropriate frameworks for addressing particular issues. Finally, they can understand the underlying bases for agreements and disagreements among various parties on important issues. The least important part of the process is the detailed technical comparison of the estimates provided by the models.
Guidelines for Policymakers
Granted that the burden of effort in building a productive modeler-policymaker relationship is on the modelers' side, there are things policymakers can do to ease the way, and it is in their interests to do so.
Guidelines for Improving Communication
Explain the purpose.
If the modeler is going to tailor the modeling and analysis process to your objectives, he or she needs to know what they are. Analyses intended to produce specific predictions of policy outcomes (and you should probably be skeptical of these) will be different from those intended to explore scenario spaces or show trade-off relationships. Explain your goals for the modeling project and specify what a successful outcome will look like. This can be difficult if you do not know exactly what you want. Be prepared to engage in dialogue with the modeler to clarify things. Give modelers what they need to know about the larger policy context in which you will be using their results. In particular, if certain assumptions are simply unacceptable, or if certain options are just beyond the pale, it is better they know sooner rather than later.
Meet frequently (or designate a representative who can).
Perhaps easier said than done, but if the modeler just gets an initial discussion of your objectives and then must go off and figure out how to meet them without further guidance, disappointment may follow. Moreover, continuing interactions with the modeler may help you clarify your on thinking on the subject and help refine the questions to get more useful results.
Guidelines for Getting More Relevant Analyses 4. Involve the modelers earlier rather than later.
Modelers sometimes feel that policymakers want instant answers to complex questions-and policymakers sometimes feel they are getting answers too late to be relevant to the policy process. Of course it is up to the modelers to meet their deadlines, but giving them enough time to study the problem, work it through, and develop analyses should result in a better product. Asking for instant answers to big, complicated problems will result in a worse product. Be prepared to make trade-offs between relevance and credibility if facing budget or schedule constraints.
State the issues and concerns clearly.
To get relevant results, explain what you see the relevant issues to be. Of course modelers and analysts are not decision-makers, but they will deliver more relevant results if they feel they can contribute something to the policy process.
Support capacity building.
At the workshop, this principle was jokingly phrased as "Modelers want a retainer." Finding the money to support the continuing operations of a modeling group is, no doubt, usually difficult. 20 Nevertheless, studies that draw on an up-to-date repository of substantive knowledge and modeling expertise are more likely to produce relevant analyses. In addition, this ongoing activity can be a source of "early warning" for you on trends and possibilities that you should be aware of. In contrast, only asking for-and only being willing to pay for-fast responses to urgent problems draws down intellectual capital and prevents its replenishment. A modeler at the workshop told of having been denied requested funding to study a particular issue. Two years later, the modeler was asked to provide a fast turn-around analysis on that very topic.
Guidelines for Getting More Credible Analyses
Understand the limitations
Demand transparency in modeling and analyses, and become familiar with the assumptions and limitations. Try explaining the assumptions and limitations to the satisfaction of the modeler(s). Ask for sensitivity analyses to show how assumptions affect outputs. Don't expect more prediction than is reasonable.
8. Help make the data available.
Sometimes the data that a modeler needs to do a credible job are difficult to come by. Or, the data is not available in formats the modeler can use. When you can bring government resources to bear on making the data available, do so. This may mean investing more in data collection, or more in "cleaning" it for modeling applications. Be willing to invest in data collection for use in future decision-making.
9. Get reviews.
Reviews of the models used by external technical experts can reveal assumptions, biases, or limitations you should know about. Reviews by external policy specialists can expose weaknesses in arguments or evidence-or can put you on firmer ground in making use of the study's results.
Get comparisons.
Policymakers may not often have the opportunity to put diverse modelers and analysts to work on the same problems. But at least they may be able to participate in, and perhaps join in sponsorship of, third-party efforts to carry out such comparisons. As with getting external technical reviews, such comparisons could lead to better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the models used by the modelers they employ. Comparisons may also lead to better insight into the sensitivities of outcomes to modeled variables and into the inherent uncertainties in the problems under study.
Conclusion
Modeling can be a valuable way to bring scientific and technical knowledge to bear on problems of public policy. But for maximum value, the modelers and policymakers need to be aware not only of the technical issues they are commonly addressing, but also of the dynamics of their professional relationship. This can be especially difficult for the modelers, who may be more comfortable attending to the substance of the problems they are addressing and the tools of analysis they are applying. Nevertheless, if they want their work to have impact and contribute to the public good, they need to take on the burden of communicating and building trust with the policymakers. The policymakers, for their part, can make this process harder or easier. Dean Brunton is Manager of Financial Assessment with Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) in Albuquerque. PNM is the largest electric and natural gas utility in the State of New Mexico. PNM also has non-utility businesses including wholesale power sales in the western US. He is responsible for economic and financial analysis of capital projects and corporate strategic initiatives. Previously he was manager of the Financial Planning and Gas Supply Planning departments with responsibility for modeling utility production and financial systems. He has also served as Risk Manager for natural gas trading operations. He has an M.A. in economics from the University of New Mexico.
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